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Herodotus Strikes Back: 
The Return of  Storytelling, or Premodernity in a New Guise?∗ 
 
Toshibumi MATSUBARA 
 
‘There are many facts in school histories, that seem to children to belong to 
lessons only. Some of these you will not find here. But you will find some stories 
that are not to be found in your school books, – stories which wise people say 
are only fairy tales and not history. But it seems to me that they are part of 
Our Island Story, and ought not to be forgotten, any more than those stories 
about which there is no doubt... Remember, too, that I was not trying to teach 
you, but only to tell a story.’ 
H. E. Marshall, Our Island Story, Preface. 
 
The Herodotus-Thucydides dichotomy, like our own Lady Murasaki-Lady Sei 
Shônagon dichotomy, is as old as the authors themselves.1 No less a person 
than Thucydides set himself against his immediate predecessor, albeit 
implicitly;2 and the subsequent generations of ancient critics were given to 
pairing them either in neutral juxtaposition or, more often, as foils – ‘glorious’ 
versus ‘horrid’ in subject, ‘smooth’ versus ‘severe’ in style, ‘trustworthy’ versus 
‘unreliable’ in content. 3 The moderns also joined in the battle: during the 
Renaissance, the Enlightenment and thereafter the two old rivals suffered 
varying ups and downs in turn according to the circumstances and tastes of the 
                                                   
∗ A shorter version of this paper was delivered at the 2006 Summer Seminar on Ancient 
History organised by the Society for the Study of the Ancient World. I wish to thank the 
participants, among others Prof. Kim Kyung-hyun from Korea University, Seoul, and Prof. 
Huang Yang from Fudan University, Shanghai, for their stimulating comments and questions. 
Yet especial thanks are due to J. G. Howie, who at an earlier stage had kindly offered me 
invaluable suggestions through correspondence and who, back in the early 90s, had been the 
catalyst for a number of the issues discussed in this paper. I should stress however that all 
the views expressed herein are strictly my own. 
1 See Morris (1967), vol. 1, pp. xiii-xxiii, for a brief English-language introduction to the 
contrasting styles, and the bitter rivalry, of the two tenth-century court ladies that have been 
seen as together constituting Japan’s greatest medieval classics. 
2 Thuc. 1.21-23; cf. 1.97; Dion. Hal. Thuc. 6; 24; Ep. ad Pomp. 3; Lucian. De hist. conscr. 42. 
3 E.g. Cic. De or. 2.55f.; Orat. 39; 219; Diod. 1.37.4; Dion. Hal. Thuc. 23f.; Ep. ad Pomp. 3; 
Quintil. 9.4.16; 10.1.73; 10.1.101; Plut. Mor. 855C, De Herod. malign. 3; Gell. NA 15.23; 
Joseph. Ap. 1.66; Lucian. De hist. conscr. 2; 18; 42; 54; Liban. Ep. 1036.5. For Herodotus’ own 
Nachleben in antiquity (both attested and inferential), see the authoritative exposition by 
Jacoby (1913), §32, and the most up-to-date one by Hornblower (2006). 
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times, and as recently as a few months ago Professor Sakurai again reminded 
us lucidly of this eternal rivalry4 – a rivalry in awkward tandem for ever 
enshrined at the National Museum of Naples, in the famous Janus-like double 
bust of the two great historians looking in opposite directions (no. 1129). Yet for 
all the vicissitudes of fortune, one may safely say that by the end of the 
nineteenth century, with German scholarship taking the lead, the balance of the 
scale had on the whole been tipped in favour of Thucydides, who was apparently 
the more credible as a historian, and clearly the more useful as a political 
commentator.5 
     With the advent of the twentieth century, however, the balance tipped the 
other way again. Thucydides suddenly found himself under the onslaught of 
iconoclastic zeal directed against him by the modern descendants of Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, represented by Cornford at the turn of the century and A. J. 
Woodman towards its end.6 At the same time a concomitant tide, shored up by 
new archaeological discoveries and moral support from some prominent names 
(Jacoby and Momigliano for a start), reversed the fortunes of Herodotus, who 
saw his credibility relatively restored.7 These iconoclasts, in their different 
ways, were mostly seeking to show that Thucydides was not as ‘objective’ (I 
avoid using the term ‘scientific’ as it is now too loaded) as he struggled to make 
his authorial persona appear. On the other hand Herodotus, it was claimed, was 
not so much a Father of Lies after all as had been deemed by many of his critics 
from Ctesias of Cnidus on down to Detlev Fehling, as the latter is often 
understood.8 What emerges from all this apparent heresy, however, is that the 
                                                   
4  Sakurai (2006); this just-appeared introductory book, although it starts from a very 
different range of interest in Herodotean historiography from that of mine inside and outside 
this essay, nevertheless seems to show (to my pleasant surprise) several potential points of 
contact. If there is anything in which I might possibly disagree with her, it will revolve 
around the question of ‘the birth of history’ (ibid., pp. 153ff.). It may simply be a matter of 
semantics or formulation rather than substance, but it is my long-held belief that history was 
born at the precise moment when someone, Herodotus, Thucydides, Aristotle, or whoever, 
asked the question: ‘What is history? What is it for?’ 
5 The modern reception of Herodotus and Thucydides at its various junctures has been 
eloquently recounted by Momigliano ([1958] 1966), pp. 135-141; and id. (1990), pp. 48-53. 
6 Cornford (1907); Woodman (1988), pp. 1-69. 
7 Jacoby (1913), esp. §28-30; Momigliano, ibid.; the most recent book to my knowledge that 
belongs to the school of ‘Herodotus as an honest man’ is Pritchett (1993); cf. also Cartledge 
and Greenwood (2002), pp. 353-363, for late twentieth-century modifications to the 
truth-debate.   
8 Ctesias T8; F1b; F9 FGH 3C.688; Fehling (1971, 19892); on the latter see further below, n. 
65. 
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criteria on which these twentieth-century scholars operated were essentially no 
different from those of their pre-twentieth century predecessors. Many of them 
may have pronounced the very opposite verdict on the two Greek historians. Yet, 
for all that, they were measuring them by the same yardstick: the degree of 
veritas, evidence-based ‘truthfulness’ in its modernist sense, or the lack of it. No 
matter: these studies certainly shook the confident assumptions of all the 
previous scholarship, so much so that at the close of the century Simon 
Hornblower felt constrained to observe somewhat sotto voce that ‘enough 
documentary evidence exists to ... reassure us that there was indeed a 
Peloponnesian War.’9 
     But single-minded obsession with veritas, it must be noted, has rarely 
been typical of many past Herodoteans who have championed their hero. In 
antiquity it was predominantly the historian’s charm of style that sold. During 
the Enlightenment his work was often preferred as a history of civilisation (or, 
in our contemporary usage, culture) over the narrowly political history of 
Thucydides.10 And in the middle of the last century Collingwood favourably 
contrasted Herodotus’ humanistic historicism, so to speak, with the ahistorical 
bent of his arch-rival towards timeless generalities11 – although it was the very 
lack of such timelessness that had earlier made Aristotle consider history (viz. 
Herodotean historia) to be inferior to poetry.12 On top of that, in the latter half 
of the same century, yet another favourable wind began to blow for Herodotus, 
and from a rather unexpected quarter: literary criticism, and a renewed interest 
it has inspired among historians in one of the most ancient arts of persuasion, 
storytelling. The title of this essay contains two keywords, ‘Herodotus’ and 
‘storytelling’, but the first keyword, it must be admitted, has been meant more 
                                                   
9 See his addendum s. v. ‘Thucydides’ in the 1996 edition of the OCD, p. 1520 col. 2; cf. also 
Connor (1984), p. 6: ‘Some felt cheated of the old Thucydides, the objective reporter, the 
scientist, the convenient source for historical facts.’ 
10 This age-old characterisation of Herodotus and Thucydides as Cultural versus Political 
History, as the dual traditions of European historiography, was reiterated only a few years 
ago by Kelly (1998). 
11 Collingwood (1946), pp. 17-31. Here and throughout this essay the term ‘historicism’ is 
used in its classic, Meineckean-Crocean sense of Historismus/istorismo, of an understanding 
of the past as a sequence of unrepeatable experiences of humankind, and not in that of 
Popper’s coinage ([1957], pp. 143ff.), a kind of teleological determinism; for the problem of the 
term, see Iggers, G. G., ‘Historicism’, in Wiener, P. W., ed., Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 
New York, 1973, vol. 2, pp. 457-464. 
12 Arist. Poet. 1451b; but see also the recent reinstatement of the presence of theological 
fatalism in Herodotus by Harrison (2000); id. (2003); Mikalson (2002). 
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as a metaphor for the second. For all that has been said so far about Herodotus, 
what follows mostly involves a story about storytelling, and what its return to 
history entails. 
     Now this story begins with a little piece of historical narrative written for 
British children at the beginning of the twentieth century: 
 
Once upon a time there was a giant called Neptune... When he grew old and 
had no more strength to rule, he gave his sceptre to the islands called Britannia, 
for we know –  
“Britannia rules the waves.” 
 
This is from the opening chapter of Our Island Story, an early post-Victorian 
account that retrieves Britain’s (England’s, really) national memory from the 
mythical periods down to the death of Queen Victoria. This once popular title, 
after having been out of print for more than half a century, was reprinted last 
year. I personally have found this book, which is of no small size, beautifully 
written and its stories quite absorbing. However, when it comes to reissuing it 
today, one cannot help but be tempted to draw a rather unsavoury analogy with, 
say, a sudden re-emergence on the bookselling market of wartime Japan’s 
national myth-history, which instead of Neptune would have the Great 
Sun-Goddess Amaterasu augustly ordaining her grandson Ninigi, the reputed 
ancestor of the imperial family, to descend upon the divine heights of ancient 
Japan, and thence to proceed into a cheering crowd of right-wing fanatics to the 
great horror of everyone else. Take another passage, from Caesar’s first 
expedition to Britain in 55 BC: ‘Thus Caesar first landed upon the shores of 
Britain. But so many of his soldiers were killed and wounded that he was glad 
to make peace with these brave islanders... Indeed, when he went away, it 
seemed rather as if he were fleeing from a foe than leaving a conquered land.’ 
This is again a very widespread stock motif of national folklore, where one 
might easily swap e.g. Caesar with Lars Porsenna and the Britons with the 
Romans in a ‘revised’ version of early Republican history. Now all this may 
sound like no new trend at all, but simply a zombie, once declared moribund by 
Walter Benjamin, returning to life in its worst form.13 Rightly so, because that 
                                                   
13 Benjamin ([1936] 1961), IV: ‘Die Kunst des Erzählens neigt ihrem Ende zu, weil die 
epische Seite der Wahrheit, die Weisheit, ausstirbt.’ It turns out, however, to have been a 
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is what this antique narrative is all about: it is a classic piece of the erzählende 
Geschichte, recreation of the past memory in the form of a continuous story (to 
follow Bernheim’s textbook definition), complete with origins, etymologies plus a 
little practical wisdom; and the publisher of its paperback edition is quite aptly 
called ‘Yesterday’s Classics’.14 
     It would certainly be naïve to look on a charming children’s book written 
more than a century ago from the lofty heights of the present, were it not for the 
fact that Our Island Story already belonged to yesterday when it was originally 
published in 1905. As the book’s very title and the preface quoted at the 
beginning of this essay suggest, its author, H. E. Marshall, then modestly 
conceived her book as ‘not a history lesson, but a story-book’. Yet in 2005, 
exactly a century after, the think-tank that reissued the book, and nearly all the 
reviewers, contradicted her by boldly and unanimously calling it a ‘history’. 
What had happened in the space of a hundred years? To this the most pertinent 
answer, in my view, came from one of those reviewers who correctly identified 
an intellectual trend that had resurrected Our Island Story from the morgue: 
the historian’s re-discovery of storytelling.15 But how can that be: a historian 
married to ‘storytelling’, with its frequent connotation of ‘lying’? Surely that 
would be a less than respectable helpmate for a person in his profession? 
Anyhow, the same reviewer wittily went on to characterise the book as 
‘cutting-edge’ because, as he or she saw it, its ‘brave mix of truth and myth’ is a 
paradoxical rebuttal of modernity and, hence, ‘impeccably postmodern’ (again 
with a pinch of sarcasm I suppose – though this last comment was deftly 
excerpted by the publisher for a blurb!). 
     Here we have that magic word, postmodernism. While it is a rather 
debatable point whether it can still claim to be ‘cutting-edge’, the word has 
certainly been around for some time. It has commonly been associated with an 
assortment of intellectual movements in the latter half of the twentieth century 
that can be seen in one way or another as rejection of modernity.16 To that 
                                                   
very long end indeed, as one finds Roland Barthes ([1967] 1984), p. 166, still giving the same 
diagnosis in the late 60s: ‘La narration historique meurt...’ 
14 A free copy of the full text of Our Island Story is available online, generously provided by 
the Baldwin Project at: http://www.mainlesson.com/ 
15 The Economist, ‘Notes on a small island’, Aug. 20, 2005. 
16 ‘Incredulity towards meta-narratives (l’incrédulité à l’égard des métarécits)’ in Lyotard’s 
([1979], p. 7) classic formulation. 
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extent it may be a unitary, coherent strand of thought. But this blanket term, 
more often used pejoratively by its detractors than by its proponents, conceals 
greatly differing ideological convictions, as well as theoretical, not to mention 
terminological, disagreements within itself – as might be expected from any 
polarising generalisations like the Optimate-Popular opposition in Republican 
Rome. The principal source of this disarray, I think, is that no one has ever been 
quite sure what exactly constitutes postmodernism’s imagined enemy, 
‘modernity’, apart from a vaguely defined Enlightenment syndrome. So it has 
come about that some of the ideological strains in one school of postmodernism 
turn out to be closer to those of the anti-postmodernist camp than another 
school of postmodernism. Or it may be talking about architecture (it originally 
was). Or may be about some impenetrable French films. Or about 
Anglo-American multiculturalism. Or about sex. In order to facilitate 
comprehension – not least for myself – I take up here just one particular variety 
of postmodernism, to which the historical discipline has reduced the term as 
being more or less synonymous: discourse theory applied to the most obvious 
form of historical representation, historiography.17 
     To give a brief illustration of what this school of postmodernism has to say 
about history and historiography, I first quote one passage which, as I see it, 
betrays one of the intellectual origins of its core tenets: 
 
Left to themselves, the facts do not speak. Left to themselves they do not exist... 
To select and affirm even the simplest complex of facts is to give them a certain 
place in a certain pattern of ideas, and this alone is sufficient to give them a 
special meaning... To set forth historical facts is not comparable to dumping a 
barrow of bricks. A brick retains its form and pressure wherever placed; but the 
form and substance of historical facts, having a negotiable existence only in 
literary discourse, vary with the words employed to convey them. 
 
What strikes us most in this startling statement, I suspect, is that it sounds 
depressingly familiar. But patience is called for. These words in fact do not 
                                                   
17 Throughout this essay I have made no conscious attempt to distinguish between ‘history’ 
and ‘historiography’, as neither term has any clear-cut definition in contemporary usage (for 
the problem see Cartledge [1997], p. 3) and, under postmodernist theorisation, all such 
distinctions are supposed to collapse. 
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emanate from a Michel Foucault or a Paul Veyne or even a Hayden White 
writing in the 70s or the 80s. They come from Carl Becker, the liberal historian 
of the Enlightenment, in his famous or notorious Presidential Address to the 
American Historical Association in 1931.18 Becker’s sentiments here are typical 
of the so-called ‘crisis of historicism’ that had simmered on since the 
Methodenstreit at the end of the nineteenth century but only reached its apogee 
in the period between the two world wars. At the same time, his views no doubt 
echo in part the American tradition of pragmatism and in part, too, the 
contemporary sense of disorientation aired by Weimar Germany’s cultural 
critics;19 and although Becker himself duly retracted them after the war, others, 
notably Meinecke, Croce, Collingwood, and later E. H. Carr, variously sought to 
address the same questions as were raised in the first part of the quotation.20 
However, in more than one way Becker’s pessimism as a whole, vented perhaps 
in some fit of tragic irony, looked forward to that of the postmodernists, who 
were to complete this cycle of scepticism by adding their own twist of extreme 
historicism.21 
     For this last group of post-war intellectuals, by deploying a combined force 
of structuralist narratology and post-structuralist deconstruction, came out onto 
the stage to declare that history, as long as it is a social and linguistic construct 
forever trapped in the infinite play of meanings at any given moment, cannot 
recount the past ‘as it really was’, but only ‘as if it really was’. At worst it is a 
rhetorical exercise in converting arbitrary concepts into concrete ‘facts’ and then 
legitimising them by suppressing all the rest as non-facts. (Is Thucydides being 
denounced?) Or at best it may be a creation of some unconscious mindset 
infused with poetic plots and tropes. (That epic poet and tragedian Herodotus?) 
And at all events it is, at the other end of the production line, bound to throw up 
a hopelessly deficient vehicle to convey what the author intends to convey to his 
                                                   
18 Becker (1932), p. 233. 
19 See, for example, Spengler’s two contemporaries (one critic, the other admirer), Lessing 
(19274), and Friedell (1927), Bd. 1, ‘Einleitung’, who were both to fall victim to Nazism later. 
For an earlier expression of the dilemmas, see among others, Nietzsche (1901), ss. 556; 604. 
20 Meinecke ([1928] 19722), pp. 270ff.; Croce (1917), esp. pp. 3ff.; 99ff.; id. (1938), pp. 1-161 
passim; Collingwood (1946), esp. pp. 202ff.; 282ff.; Carr (1961). 
21  On Becker’s precocity and its inter-war historical context, see Wright (1999). His 
understanding of ‘facts’ as unstable discursive constructs closely parallels the more concrete 
definition of ‘facts’, as opposed to ‘le réel’ or ‘events’, later delineated by Barthes ([1967] 1984), 
pp. 163ff., and White (1995), pp. 238ff.; see also Veyne (1971), pp. 48ff.; Berkhofer (1995), pp. 
53ff.; Munz (1997), pp. 854ff., with varying appellations for the same distinction. 
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prospective readers. (For confirmation one only has to read the first few 
paragraphs of this essay on the subsequent fate of the two Greeks!) All these 
add up to show, according to this view, that history is generally no more than a 
species of realistic literature, and specifically a class of self-referential 
storytelling that passes for truth-telling, just as much as myth once did. Indeed, 
as Claude Lévi-Strauss once remarked and the Venus mural in California’s 
Venice Beach concurred, history is our myth. 22  By arguing thus these 
intelligent folks, in their own peculiar ways but to a devastating effect by some 
fatalists’ estimate, ditched once and for all that classic Aristotelian distinction 
between history and poetry,23 resurrecting instead the equally ancient thesis of 
Quintilian, that history is, after all, a kind of prose-poem.24 No more, no less. 
And the more radical pundits, in a natural extension of the death of the Author 
in literature announced by French post-structuralism and the American New 
Criticism, went so far as to proclaim the death of the Historian. To study history 
is not to study the past – nor even the historian. What really matters is ‘wie es 
eigentlich gelesen’ by the Reader. So, the logical upshot of this line of argument 
would be that, at one extreme, it is perfectly possible, irrespective of external 
documents, to argue that there was indeed no Peloponnesian War – in much the 
same way as Jean Baudrillard argued that the Gulf War had never taken place 
(‘La guerre du Golfe n’a pas eu lieu’).25 
     This blatantly nihilist assault on the received notion of history, which 
horrified even the venerable Momigliano, naturally led to fierce controversies, 
cries of foul play, feigned what’s-new apathy, and more thoughtful 
counter-offensives.26 At stake was more than just the narrowly professional 
credibility of historians; the idea of historical truth as nothing more than a 
mirage, pseudea etymoisin homoia, conjured up by ‘the lays of a poet’ clearly 
carried far wider, potentially sinister implications. Those engaged in ancient 
history, it is true, often innocently accept, or even welcome, the notion that 
                                                   
22 Lévi-Strauss (1979), pp. 42f.; Rip Cronk, Venice Reconstituted, 1989, Venice Beach Hotel, 
Exterior (a postmodern adaptation of Boticelli's Birth of Venus). 
23 Arist. Poet. 1451b; cf. Cic. Leg. 1.5; Lucian. De hist. conscr. 8. 
24 Quintil. 10.1.31. 
25 Baudrillard (1991). 
26 Most famously Momigliano (1981); see also Murray (1991), p. 63, observing the Italian 
polymath in his late years: ‘The signs of impatience with theoreticians became more 
prominent ... he admired Foucault and Marshall Sahlins perhaps, but was visibly distressed 
by the view of his American colleague Hayden White, that history was a form of rhetoric.’ 
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there may be as many stories as there are historians and as many readings as 
there are readers as a premise for innovative thinking. With the more recent 
past, however, such Pyrrhonian relativism, or ‘narrativism’ as it is fancily called, 
all too easily lends itself to innovation of a perverse kind. One only need look at 
David Irving in the dock to see the point: the postmodernist poetics of history, 
largely born out of the left-wing radicalism of the 60s and the early 70s by way 
of recouping traditionally marginalised voices, threatens to play into the sticky 
hands of all sorts of other happily buried demons, the ugliest among them the 
right-wing revisionism from the 80s on.27 This last danger first became widely 
publicised with the Paul de Man affair in the late 80s, which deconstructed, as it 
were, the late leading deconstructionist as a one-time Nazi collaborationist.28 
     Yet more pertinent to my story is probably a similar warning raised 
against postmodernism at about the same time, though in an altogether 
separate context. Curiously it emerged from de Man’s intellectual defender 
Christopher Norris, during the UK’s so-called ‘history debate’ that involved a 
proposed national curriculum in English and Welsh schools. 29  This debate 
gained, and continues to gain, far wider resonance beyond a single policy issue. 
It may therefore be no coincidence, in this context, that Civitas, the think-tank 
that reissued Our Island Story, had backed (on its ‘blog’ site) a plea made earlier 
last year by Tim Collins, the then Conservative shadow education secretary, to 
                                                   
27 This question is variously addressed by Friedländer et al. (1992); and most recently by 
Moses (2005); cf. the postmodernist apologia by Eagleston (2004); Jenkins and Munslow 
(2004), p. 14. I am here also alluding, one may easily understand, to the embarrassing 
publication in the last decade of a number of crackpot Japanese histories with unabashedly 
revisionist agenda, some of them selectively adopting useful bits of postmodernist and 
postcolonial language for their own ends, while some others cloaking their meta-narrative of 
shabby nationalism in strings of ‘little stories’; for an English-language review of this 
neo-nationalist abuse, see Nozaki (2005): ‘The Nationalist Appropriation of Postmodern 
Vocabulary’. We might recall too, that their forefathers were after all already arguing ‘how to 
overcome modernity (kindai-no-chôkoku)’ in the early 1940s. For the general problem of the 
synthesis of old bigotry and new ideology, see Buruma and Margalit (2004), pp. 142ff. 
28 For an engaging story of this startling revelation in 1987 and its aftermath, see Lehman 
(1991), ‘Part 2: the Fall of Paul de Man’; cf. also Ginzburg (1999), pp. 16ff., which identifies a 
common strand of thought running from Nietzsche to Jacques Derrida and de Man that 
‘fascinate[s] at the same time both the heirs of the colonizers and the heirs of the colonized.’ 
29 Norris (1988). On the Thatcherite programme to introduce a fixed national curriculum into 
history education in the late 80s, and the broader debates that had preceded and followed it, 
see the contributions by respected historians in Gardiner et al. (1990); cf. also Elton ([1984] 
1991); Evans (1997), pp. 179f.; for another follow-up to the debate, I refer to the two articles 
‘History lessons’ and ‘Achtung! Too many Nazis’ in The Economist, Nov. 3, 2001. 
 66 
revive a national narrative for ‘the survival of the British nation’; 30  and 
although I doubt if the book would serve the purpose for any other nation than 
the English, similar calls are now increasingly heard from the Labour 
government itself.31 True, given the current socio-political atmosphere in the 
UK, the need for a modest corrective to the excessive multiculturalism of the 
postmodernist left, with its perceived dissolution of all communal values, might 
be cited as a rationale for reissuing the book. It is also true that Caesar, a clever 
but greedy continental, in full flight from the wild but brave ‘Britons’ is only 
harmlessly funny. But this kind of move, whatever its intent, always risks 
striking an unfortunate chord with another sort of postmodernism at the other 
end of the political spectrum. Thucydides was true indeed to his reputation as a 
historian of synchronic truth when he spoke against writing history for ‘the 
applause of the moment’: not only literary or theatrical applause but, we might 
read here, revisionist applause.32 Although we may not escape in the end from 
the dictum that every history is contemporary history, this is not the kind of 
history we would want, for the postmodern age or otherwise.33 
                                                   
30 Tim Collins quoted as saying in The Guardian, ‘Conscription of the Past’, June 11, 2005, by 
the popularising historian Tristram Hunt, who concludes his criticism of the Tory proposal 
with a raw rant against an odd axis of evil of the USA, Japan and India, and a panegyric of 
‘our’ liberal, pluralist, reflexive tradition of history teaching – thereby inadvertently 
succumbing to the same pervasive mythology of national exceptionalism (Britain in his 
version being uniquely tolerant and open to diversity), around which quasi-intellectual 
discourses of every political shade in every country tend to revolve; we see the same chimera 
at work, on the Conservative front, in Elton ([1984] 1991), pp. 113ff. Another figure that 
might be of some interest in this story is Arthur Bryant, who as educational adviser to the 
Conservative government in the 30s was responsible for the inter-war organisation of 
historical pageants based on the episodes of Our Island Story: cf. Roberts (1994), ch. 6 (a 
polemic that depicts the late Tory historian as an opportunistic weak ideologue, one-time 
Nazi sympathiser and naïve upholder of mystic ‘Englishry’). 
31 The Economist, Aug. 20, 2005, ibid. 
32 As every scholar since Niebuhr would agree, revisionism – all manner of it – was a 
notoriously ancient pastime, feeding a well-established source of polemics to Thucydides (e.g. 
the founding ‘mythistory’ of Athenian democracy) and for that matter nearly every other 
ancient author; Thucydides’ work itself, needless to say, was a ‘revisionist history, albeit of an 
exceptionally powerful variety’ (Connor [1984], p. 11); so was Herodotus’ (Lateiner [1989], p. 
42); and so was, after all, Hecataeus’ (F1 FGH 1A.1). It may be noted, too, that Japan’s oldest 
extant narrative history, The Records of Ancient Matters (Kojiki), was composed already in 
the spirit of ‘correcting’ the past: ‘Hereupon, regretting the errors in the old words, and 
wishing to correct the misstatements in the former chronicles, She [Empress Genmyô] ... 
commanded me Yasumaro to select and record the old words...’ (1. Pref. 11, following B. H. 
Chamberlain’s classic translation). 
33 That is, the kind of pseudo-history commonly referred to as ‘romantic history’ (cf. Meinecke 
[1951], pp. 15f.), and specifically as la storia poetica and praticistica, so named, and strongly 
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     Even today the dust of the postmodern battles has barely settled, at least 
in humanities and social sciences. It is a measure of the lingering enmity that 
sporadic mortars are still being launched against the whole idea of 
deconstructing history by traditionalists of wildly diverse ideological 
persuasions, from the British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm to the American 
neo-conservative classicist Donald Kagan.34 However, the last couple of decades 
of the twentieth century also witnessed the more accommodating scholars start 
parallel diplomacy with postmodernism. These negotiatory tactics, for all 
practical purposes, can be divided into three categories or so, with large overlaps 
between them. 35  On the theoretical front, the first group of sceptical and 
cautious historians seems on the whole to have shifted their ground to a more 
measured ‘containment’ policy by the end of the 90s.36 The second, which seems 
to me the most predominant, is an active engagement strategy, or the 
historian’s equivalent of the Third Way.37 This has translated into an eclectic, 
and often tacit, takeover of the very theoretical weaponry developed since the 
late 60s under the broader rubric of the so-called linguistic turn, of which 
postmodernism was the last and ultimate weapon of mass deconstruction; yet it 
has now been deployed not to ‘disable’ the fundamentals of ‘our own history’, but 
to ‘empower’ them,38 scientifically as it were. In classical studies, for example, 
the study of storytelling, or narratology, of all theoretical hues has most 
cogently and profitably been casting newly critical lights on literary works, er, 
texts, including those of Herodotus and Thucydides (often without invoking the 
older ‘Homeric’ question of their compositional processes, or even the modernist 
question of their veritas);39 the underlying assumption, presumably, being that 
                                                   
repudiated, by none other than Croce (1917), pp. 26-36; yet id. (1938), pp. 181-190, more 
bluntly calls it la storia di tendenza and di partito. 
34 Hobsbawm (2005); Kagan (2005); for an earlier voice of conservative conscience, see Elton 
(1991), pp. 27-73. 
35 For a different classification, see Jenkins (1997), which instead divides the debate into five 
camps (for and against postmodernist histories, for and against the collapse of the ‘lower case’ 
history, and the ambiguous). 
36 E.g. Eley (1996); Evans (1997); Ginzburg (1999). 
37 Rosenau (1991); Berkhofer (1995); Burke et al. (20012) are among the more sympathetic 
towards various postmodernist theories. 
38 To paraphrase Eley (1996), p. 214. 
39 The last few decades have seen a profusion of narratological as well as broadly cultural 
studies on Herodotus: Fornara (1971); Hartog (1980); Lang (1984); Gould (1989); Lateiner 
(1989); Evans (1991); Harrison (2000); Thomas (2000); Munson (2001); of these the narrative 
analyses are almost invariably Unitarian (save Fornara, ibid.), and many of the cultural 
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whatever one is to make of modern historiography, the pre-modern variety can 
safely be treated just the same as any other branches of literature like poetry 
and oratory.40 But more broadly, before the linguistic turn started to encroach 
on the historical profession itself, practitioners of cultural history, many of them 
anxious to supplant or supplement the old socio-economic determinism with the 
new cultural determinism, 41  had already extended this linguistic model to 
explore the whole range of human discourse at all social levels, from visual 
representations to oral traditions, from Greek cultic practices to actions of a 
Roman emperor, discovering in them codes, plots, tropes, allusions, structures, 
symmetries, binary oppositions, paradigms, meta-narratives, mentalité, 
self-constructions, dominations, oppressions, subversions, or whatever they 
                                                   
enquiries tend to start from mildly New Historicist contextualism while leaving a large scope 
for authorial agency; the intellectual concerns that permeate these works also inform the two 
recent compendia of the latest Herodotean scholarship by Bakker, de Jong and van Wees 
(2002), and Dewald and Marincola (2006); and these in addition to numerous individual 
articles for which one is advised to refer to those compendia; see also below, nn. 66-71, for 
more bibliog. On the other hand interest in Thucydides in terms of the linguistic and cultural 
turns has understandably been centred on his narrative techniques: see the general 
narratological studies by Dewald (2005), a published version of her 1975 dissertation; 
Hornblower (1994); Rood (1998); for an application of postmodernist theory (intertextuality, 
reader-response criticism etc.), see Connor (1984); the late twentieth-century reception of 
Thucydides in these directions is broadly explored and exploited in the latest monograph by 
Greenwood (2006). Yet the second half of the classic work of Cornford (1907), who, as it 
happens, was another earlier example to cave in to the discursive nature of both ancient and 
modern historiography (pp. viiif.), was in several respects ‘narratological’ long before the term 
was coined; in particular, he identified a set of tragic modes operating in Thucydidean 
narrative; for the literature after Cornford on the subject, see Greenwood, ibid., pp. 21f.; 
83-108. More recent scholarship has further enlarged its scope to look for the historian’s 
affinity, set in a wider literary and cultural milieu or ‘intertextuality’, with other types of 
poetry, above all with the epic (see the latest bibliog. in Howie [2005], p. 208 n. 4) but also the 
epinician: Howie (1998), a revised translation of his 1984 German article; most recently 
Hornblower (2004). Short narratological studies (with convenient bibliographies) on various 
Greek authors are collected in a recent anthology by de Jong, Nünlist and Bowie (2004). 
40 It is a curious matter of fact that OCD3’s rather long review by D. P. Fowler and P. G. 
Fowler of the twentieth-century history of ‘literary criticism and classical studies’ (pp. 871ff.) 
dodges the question of historiography, bar a single passing note: ‘[narratology] is often seen 
as the least “threatening” approach ... except perhaps in relation to historiography.’ This 
perceived threat, however, has conversely elicited calls for drawing a line between fictional 
and historical narratives from narratological theorists themselves: see Genette (1993), pp. 
54ff.; Cohn (1999); on which more below, n. 54. 
41 On this Herodotean Custom-is-the-King-of-all fixation, see Jones (1996); what Hobsbawm 
had hailed as ‘continuation’ ([1980], p. 8), he laments instead as a liability, as ‘the determinist 
fix’, ‘the undead residue of historical materialism’ in the tradition, esp. in the Foucauldian 
tradition, of cultural history. 
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chose to discover.42 The third response, and this is what matters to this essay, is, 
well, a conditional surrender, so to speak. That is, frankly to accept the 
acceptable part of the postmodernist challenge, and to (re)create history as such: 
a story. 
     Before going further, some clarification will be required of words like 
‘story’ and ‘narrative’, for much confusion has been brought in by the loose 
terminology of literary theories, by common usage and not least by 
pseudo-academic obfuscation. First, ‘story’ in this case should not, as every so 
often it does, imply ‘fiction’. I said ‘conditional’ because no historian with a 
conscience would be prepared to demolish the fundamental borderline between 
history and fiction. On the other hand story does not, as it does in formalist 
narratology, refer to the hypothetical sequence of actual events themselves 
either. By story I simply mean what narratologists variously call ‘narrative’ 
‘story’ ‘sjuzhet’ – the form rather than the content.43 And the kind of narrative I 
have in mind does not include every form of narrative discourse in its broadest 
possible sense, like meta-narratives or pictures or maps or statistics or perhaps 
DNA history, but one particular mode of linguistic representation, word-based 
narrative. Nor does it deal with what is happening, as a live report does, what 
will happen, as prophecy or fortune-telling does, or what generally happens, as a 
gnomic saying does. It is all and only about what happened, and the way it is 
arranged in some coherent string (often chronological and nearly always causal, 
with the added variety of occasional leaps in time or anachrony) and reworked 
into a realistic story – that is, ‘narrative history’ in its most conventional sense. 
 
                                                   
42 In this context the younger generations of the French Annales school or the cultural 
theorists of the New History may come to mind as being representative; but for my own 
preferences I refer to the more ‘humanistic’ approaches adopted for Roman historical 
traditions by people like Peter Wiseman and Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg, and the 
contributors to the anthology in the former’s honour edited by Braund and Gill (2003); see 
also Coudry and Späth (2001), a more pan-European project in the same vein. 
43 It may certainly be contested, quite rightly, that the form as signifier – the emplotment 
(linking of items through a postulated chain of cause and effect), the order (arrangement of 
items or plots), the duration (narrative rhythms, or emphases given to particular items or 
plots), the mood (focalisation, or viewpoints), the voice (‘what I think really happened’ versus 
‘what is thought to have really happened’ etc.) – decides the content as signified; so that the 
form is itself an interpretative and/or propositional discourse. But I excuse myself for leaving 
aside this thorny question by simply noting that it is immaterial to my current argument 
whether the content thus generated presents itself as such, a story, a probable truth, or 
pretends to be the Story, the nonnegotiable Truth. 
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     Time was when history indeed stood for story or history ad narrandum. 
Only a century ago G. M. Trevelyan was still able to defend it as the ‘bedrock’ of 
history.44 But within less than fifty years, professional scholarship had pushed 
this once most familiar or even self-evident means of history-telling 
dramatically out of fashion, replacing it with history ad probandum or 
analytical history structured in horizontal, thematic alignment; so much so that 
Arthur Keaveney, in the late 80s, had to open his narrative history of the course 
of the Italian Social War with an apologetic excuse that ‘this is an unashamedly 
old-fashioned book’;45 and Peter Munz, in the late 90s, quipped that nowadays 
historians were the only people around who refused to see the past as a time 
structure.46 It is no surprise, therefore, that the renewed call for narrative 
history should have come not only from those postmodernist critics who 
preferred its apparently unassuming mode of representation to the social 
scientif-ish, argumentative, often mystifying variety, 47  but also from 
respectable historians who deplored the scholarly condemnation of traditional 
narrative to such opprobrium. In fact the talk as well as practice of narrative is 
nearly as old as postmodern narrativism itself: it originated from an incipient 
offshoot of the social history of the late 70s that was to evolve into what is today 
cultural history.48 
                                                   
44 Trevelyan (1913), pp. 1-55; cf. also Friedell (1927), Bd. 1, pp. 16f. 
45 Keaveney (1987), ‘Introduction’. 
46 Munz (1997), pp. 851ff. Munz’s criticism was directed at structuralist historiography in 
general, but it may also have been a more specific rebuke to Paul Veyne’s oxymoronic precept 
that ‘le temps n’est pas essentiel à l’histoire’ ([1971], pp. 83f.); yet incidentally this too has a 
curiously ancient ring, as for example when Eunapius (F1 Müller = F1 Blockley) proclaims: 
‘…whereas the highest aim and function of history is to record events with a minimum of 
subjectivity and in the light of the truth, the details of chronology (hoi akribeis logismoi tôn 
chronôn), intruding irrelevantly like uncalled witnesses, are of no help in this. For what do 
dates contribute to the wisdom of Socrates or the acuity of Themistocles? Were they great 
men only during the summer? Did one see them growing and shedding their virtues like 
leaves according to the time of the year?’ (tr. by Blockley). 
47 Leading narrativists such as Hayden White ([1978], pp. 83ff.; 117f. and passim) and 
Dominick LaCapra (1985) are natural advocates of the historian’s self-reflexive use of literary, 
rather than technical, devices (many of them, however, opt for colourless, often arcane prose 
styles in their own work); for the storytelling school of postmodernism, see Rosenau (1991), pp. 
66; 84. 
48 The ‘revival of narrative’ was first publicly recognised by the late anti-postmodernist social 
historian Lawrence Stone (1979); yet as Hobsbawm (1980) was quick to point out, the kind of 
narrative Stone was then speaking of was by and large confined to the ‘little-story’ or 
micro-narrative type of social and cultural history (other specimens are only cursorily 
discussed at ibid., pp. 19ff.). 
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     It was these convergent trends of the linguistic, cultural and postmodern 
turns that staged the triumphant return of storytelling. ‘History as a story’, once 
thus restored, has since then disseminated far beyond the narrow confines of 
social and cultural history, breathing new life even into the ‘old-fashioned’ great 
stories of war, politics and revolution.49 Its success has been such that in the 
late 90s even the epitome of the source-bound, common-sense empiricism in the 
mould of Richard Evans approvingly noted that postmodernism had helped 
restore legitimacy to literary narrative in history writing,50 a sentiment which 
certainly represents one strand of British historical tradition that Trevelyan 
had so strenuously and somewhat parochially vindicated. Probably this 
unexpected revival of traditional storytelling can also be linked to the similar 
phenomenon detectable in those areas that had earlier been taken on by literary 
deconstruction, such as novels, films and theatrical performances. Ancient 
history, with its long tradition of communicating itself through storytelling, 
might naturally be expected to be in the vanguard of this enterprise. Yet curious 
as it may seem, it has so far been less successful than the later periods in 
translating this new current into ‘serious’ academic writings. The majority of 
today’s titles that do practise the art of storytelling on ancient history are either 
elementary books stocked on the shelves of local schools, or the so-called 
‘popularising histories’ to be found in corner bookstores. To be sure, these books 
are of great worth in their own right, often informative and sometimes 
ingenious. The point is that these types of history have always been there 
anyway, with or without postmodernism. Our Island Story was just one such. 
     This relative failure to produce narrative history on any grand scale is 
fairly understandable. For it simply takes time to change an intellectual habit, 
or paradigm, framed in terms of analytical, ‘deadly serious’ history resplendent 
with big footnotes (like the ones you see on these pages). And, as intellectual 
trends go, ancient historians in the last fifty years or so have tended to catch, 
and drop off, the train last. Perhaps such conservatism is not in itself a bad 
thing, since postmodernist literary theory, as noted, has always run the risk of 
being hijacked by ‘cultural guerrillas’ for politically pernicious ends. The risk of 
making history cater solely to the present is no less real for ancient history; in a 
                                                   
49 For the literature on the development of narrative history since the late 70s, see Berkhofer 
(1995), chs. 2-3; Evans (1997), pp. 142ff.; 244ff.; Burke (20012), pp. 283-300. 
50 Evans (1997), pp. 244ff. 
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way all the more so, given what E. H. Carr once called the ‘built-in ignorance’ of 
ancient historians.51 Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, after all, are only the 
most egregious cases of modern exploitation of the grand narrative that was 
Classical Antiquity.52 Although it may be a bit of a stretch to draw another 
example from a children’s book, it is also interesting to observe how the earlier 
chapters of Our Island Story seamlessly weave the Graeco-Roman past into the 
story of England, largely through a generous reading of Roman historiography 
and medieval English chronicles (Nennius, Geoffrey of Monmouth etc. – via 
John Milton?). Even we in East Asia may not be immune from erecting modern 
myths upon the same Graeco-Roman past for our own sake – by drawing false 
analogies, for example, or toying with some ‘Occidentalist’ generalisations.53 
And there are of course practical difficulties involved in writing a narrative that 
is both readable, even entertaining, and yet acceptable to the current academic 
norms and standards. At best it may end up as just another popular history, 
and at worst as a populist history. 
     It is surely beyond the scope of this modest essay to come up with a handy 
answer to such old questions as how to achieve the two goals of turning out a 
piece of historical writing capable of filling one’s soul with iucundissima 
lectionis voluptate, and at the same time keeping Neptune, Amaterasu and 
suchlike at bay; or how to prevent the historical Alexander or Caesar from 
descending into the Alexanders or Caesars of novels and Hollywood films.54 But 
                                                   
51 Carr (1961), p. 14. 
52 To take a less frightening example, it has been fashionable for some time to argue that the 
modern narrative of the ancient Völkerwanderung was a nationalist myth created to 
legitimatise the nation states of Europe: on this debate see Geary (2002); for the history of 
this ‘Germanist paradigm’ in the European historiography since the Reformation, Kelly 
(1998), pp. 174-187; 204f.; 221f. But the younger Ward-Perkins ([2005], pp. 172ff.), meanwhile, 
has lately added a new twist by suggesting that the now prevalent alternative model, a 
peaceful assimilation of the Germanic tribes into the Roman world (see Cameron [2002], pp. 
169ff.), bears just as many political overtones within the context of the European integration. 
One might easily dismiss this as just another peculiarly British paranoia, and the charge of 
partisanship is in any case the historian’s rhetorical stock in trade to marginalise the 
proverbial Other. Still, I feel there is something more than that in Ward-Perkins’ view. And I 
feel, too, that the whole debate now stands every chance of being further affected by the 
question of European Islam. 
53 See e.g. the nineteenth-century Slavophile rejection of classical traditions as illustrated by 
Buruma and Margalit (2004), pp. 90ff. 
54 Postmodernism is all too willing to collapse this distinction between history and historical 
fiction: e.g. Adhikari (2002) unhesitatingly restyles the class of literature conventionally (but 
not unreasonably) designated ‘historical novels’ – A Farewell to Arms, The Bridge on the 
River Quai, Laurence of Arabia, War and Peace and so on – as ‘literary’ ‘fictionalised’ or 
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even in our hazy world of ancient history, storytelling, of a sort, seems to be 
making a cautious comeback. Since the late 90s in particular, major review 
journals attest a small but gradual growth in the number of publications in 
history that self-consciously tell stories or at least contain large chunks of 
narrative, if such crude quantification is anything to go by.55 True, not all the 
narrators in these books may be qualified storytellers. But even in the heydays 
of narrative history, I should not suppose everyone was a Gibbon or a Macaulay. 
It is also true that some of these studies are of the new-old, counter-reformation 
streak, as much in content as in form, reviving older views and concentrating 
almost exclusively on the political, institutional and individual. But again, that 
is in the end what a ‘return’ is all about.56 It may well be legitimate, therefore, 
                                                   
‘unconventional history’. In practical terms, however, such a distinction is more easily stated 
than implemented: see the general survey of the problem by Berkhofer (1995), pp. 45-75. On 
the purely formal level, such narratological ‘signposts’ as observed by Genette (1993), pp. 
54-84, and Cohn (1999), pp. 109-131, may serve as some kind of rough measures to demarcate 
fictional from non-fictional narratives – granted, of course, that the author of the narrative is 
conscious, indeed conscientious, about what he or she is doing, i.e. writing a historical fiction 
and not, like Lucian’s True Stories, a fictional history (cf. Genette, ibid., p. 78 n. 33; pp. 82ff.); 
that the reader is clever enough (both sore points postmodernist theory would call into 
question); and that one is not deterred by these narratologists’ characteristic but unhelpful 
penchant for heterodiegetic jargon and artifictional neologism in formulating their 
observations. On the level of content, the solutions proposed all tend to settle on either 
implausible eclecticism (Munz [1997]; Burke [20012]; Bevir [2002]) or otherwise a somewhat 
bland reassertion of the ‘referential’ constraints imposed on historiography, i.e. empirically 
solid evidence outside interpretation, or Carr’s metaphorical shape of a mountain 
(Momigliano [1981], pp. 260ff.; Evans [1997], chs. 3-4; 8; Cohn [1999], ibid.; Ginzburg [1999], 
pp. 101ff.). But such external referentiality, if attainable at all (which, again, postmodernism 
denies as it denies the possibility of access to the extratextual or ontological reality of the 
past), is heavily limited in the case of ancient history by the opposite kind of constraints, that 
is, the very narrow scope for material corroboration. Few periods of ancient history would 
ultimately be recoverable without recourse to that proverbial ‘reasoned conjecture’. Yet where 
exactly does reasoned conjecture end and imaginative fiction begin? The Peloponnesian War, 
we may concede, was a construct ‘real’ enough; the Persian War, probably. But what about, 
say, the Trojan War, an epic war that is ‘situated at the edge of history’ (Hartog [2000], p. 
388)? 
55 This (admittedly impressionistic) observation is based on The Classical Review and the 
online Bryn Mawr Classical Review. 
56 For one thing, the micro-narrative approach commonly practised in the historiography of 
the more recent past is considerably harder to apply to the remote past: the passage of time 
has robbed historical nobodies of enough documentation to turn their experiences into 
sustained petites histoires or little stories. Yet two recent biographical studies, one on 
Alexander (Mossé [2001]) and the other on Nero (Champlin [2003]), seem to show how much 
light can still be shed even on such irredeemable ‘great men’ with a fusion of traditional 
Quellenkritik, late twentieth-century representation theory and postmodern exercises in 
storytelling. No doubt this fusion may not always be successful, and its ‘newness’ more a 
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to ask: where does this ‘return’ get us? Can we really say it is signalling one 
genuine trend in a healthy direction for the years to come? Or is it not just a 
temporary retreat from the present mess supposedly created by an array of 
intellectual trends that have been lumped together as postmodernism? Or worse, 
is it not a deplorable regression to pre-modernity, the postmodernists’ other 
favourite, disguised as postmodernism or post-postmodernism? To these I can 
only say, in the best empiricist tradition, nec satis scio, nec, si sciam, discere 
ausim – for every future prediction is bound to fail. However, I may observe the 
following points, and in spite of all the possible pitfalls so far indicated, register 
a humble appeal of my own for storytelling. 
     First, it has certainly been easy to mock postmodernism for the inherent 
absurdities of many of its propositions when turned on their head (or to put it 
another way: its theory against all theories, the myth of ending all the myth of 
modernity, the universal challenge against the universal, the call for 
‘historicising’ everything while denying history, the very grand narrative of 
postmodernism, and so on). It has also been easy to criticise the more extreme 
school of postmodernism for its Foucauldian reduction of the consensual model 
of historical knowledge, however flawed and problematic in its very nature, to a 
mere set of crass ideologies and tools of power; and for its utter failure to take 
account of the referential or corroboratory side of historical enquiry, not to 
mention its public and ethical dimensions. 57  But rather than accusing 
postmodernism of what it fails to do, one ought rather to grapple with it in 
terms of what it does – to take issue with the historian’s exposition, which had 
largely been passed over by modern ‘Philosophy of History’. And what 
postmodernist experiments have taught him, or better reminded him, is that it 
is decent stories, rather than cold analyses, that make people listen, understand 
and – may I dare use the tricky word – empathise. We should all know this, to 
our pain, from our daily struggle with those long-faced undergrads ever 
determined to cling to the back of lecture rooms. 
     Secondly, for all the talk of postmodernism having had its day (let us leave 
aside the obvious paradox of there ever being an end to the ‘after-modern’), it 
                                                   
matter of terminology than methodology, but we are, after all, still at the end of a long 
beginning, from which something in some way innovative might arise in a Viconian spiral. 
57 On this last point, see Moses (2005), a timely criticism of White’s redemptive poetics of 
history. 
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continues to haunt history. That is precisely because its argument has disturbed 
those notoriously ancient hotspots of historiography, all of which, ultimately, 
bear on the epistemological question of objective truth: the boundary between 
history and literature, between history and rhetoric, between history and myth. 
These questions, needless to say, have a long pedigree, reaching back in modern 
times to the sixteenth-century humanists through Vico, ‘that eccentric 
arationalist’ of the Enlightenment,58 and ultimately descending from antiquity, 
from Thucydides, Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, Quintilian, Lucian to name but a 
few. In the ranks of those who did question them, we could also count a few 
respectable names in modern Geschichtswissenschaft: von Ranke, indeed, 
together with his critic Droysen, who both had the temerity to argue that 
history is somehow a mixture of science and art;59 or, to put it in more recent 
parlance, a synthesis of referentiality and representation. ‘Just as Marx was not 
a Marxist, Ranke was not a Rankean,’ to borrow the phrase of Peter Burke.60 So, 
as the postmodernists themselves gladly acknowledge, there is nothing 
particularly postmodern about them. These are issues that have arrested the 
minds of all generations of humanity, ancients and moderns alike. Some have 
taken these ambiguities as embarrassing shortcomings, to be stamped out at all 
costs. Others have turned them to their own advantage, to promote collective 
amnesia or to create narratives of redemption for this resentment or that 
trauma, and thereby to deform the whole shape of history. Still others have 
discovered in them the very merits and promises of history, sources of its 
imaginative power to restore flesh and blood to a world that is no longer with us. 
For this last school, such a venerable master of literary history as Gibbon may 
be too ancient a modern case to cite, but even in our twentieth century we have 
                                                   
58 White (1973), p. 51. 
59 Ranke ([1830s] 1954), pp. 290f.: ‘Die Historie unterscheidet sich dadurch von allen anderen 
Wissenschaften, daß sie zugleich Kunst ist... Als Wissenschaft ist sie der Philosophie, als 
Kunst der Poesie verwandt.’; Droysen (1868), p. 78: ‘auch bei uns ist die Einsicht gewonnen 
oder das Zugeständniss gemacht, dass „die Historie Kunst und Wissenschaft zugleich sei“.’ 
60  Burke (20012), p. 3. See the process of Rankeanism, faced with mounting historical 
scepticism, hardening into an unyielding yet not necessarily consistent dogma by the end of 
the nineteenth century: e.g. the notorious decree pronounced by J. B. Bury ([1903] 19722), pp. 
210; 223, ‘history is a science, no less and no more,’ which has since been subjected to much 
ridicule for its naturalistic understanding of science, but which was in fact more of an 
expression of ‘a mind torn between two conceptions’(so Collingwood [1946], p. 148); see also 
Adams (1909), pp. 231f., around the same period: ‘Is history a science or an art?... [The 
question] attempts to make a distinction which does not exist.’ 
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the formidable example of Ronald Syme, who practised the art of combining 
research with literary narrative to intimidating effect.61 
     Thus it was not for nothing that Cicero opined that the best orator is the 
best historian; and not for nothing that Lucian, while vehemently eschewing 
poetic partisan history, nevertheless prescribed ‘a touch and share of poetry’ for 
history writing.62 Since the rise of positivist science if not ever since the time of 
Hecataeus of Miletus, historical practice has more often than not followed 
fashionable abstract theories, and first-rate research thrives on what some 
cynics have termed conceptual plagiarism: historical materialism, Weberian 
sociology, econometrics, cultural anthropology, semiotic linguistics, 
psychoanalysis, physiology, neo- and post-Marxism, ethnic studies, gender 
theory, and what not of any other disparate offshoot of social sciences and 
cultural studies. The inventory goes on and on. In this dazzling hypermarket of 
after-modern theories, storytelling is one of the very few items still left for sale, 
only waiting for a serious customer to grab. It is also one of the more marketable 
of postmodernist novelties to the historian. For I see no intrinsic harm, with 
good inspiration and due adjustment, in applying a prudent degree of ‘Clio’s 
cosmetics’ to the complexion of history, any more than processing it through the 
heavy surgery of tyrannical theories that tend to snip off uncomfortable warts of 
empirical details. 
     Some historians of postmodernist stripe, on the other hand, have viewed 
the revival of narrative, especially political narrative of the traditional order, as 
reactionary; and instead argued that the thematic, theoretical and 
multiculturalist approach is more ‘sympathetic and accessible’. 63  A very 
un-postmodern value judgement I fear to say, in that it equates the validity of 
one mode of representation with its perceived superiority over others – or should 
I say the Other? Anyhow that complacent belief in its supposed ‘accessibility’ 
seems to sit somewhat uneasily with the grim fact that popular narrative 
histories with an overtly élitist outlook continue to draw a large audience, far 
larger than merely the dominant, conservative male folks, and with a reach that 
professional scholarship could only dream of matching. (Like it or not, in Japan 
                                                   
61 See Wiseman ([1997] 1998), which at various points raises the question of history and 
fiction in Syme’s major works. 
62 Cic. De or. 2.36; 2.62; Leg. 1.5ff.; Lucian. De hist. conscr. 8; 45 (but compare his Ver. hist. 
1.2-4); see also Diod. 20.1-2; Plut. Mor. 347A-E, Bell. an Pac. praest. Ath. 3. 
63 Cameron (2002), pp. 176ff. 
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we have Ms Nanami Shiono’s vast literary output on Roman history.) I am in no 
position to weigh the relative merits and demerits in either approaches, but why 
assume, in the first place, that narrative history is only good for throwing up 
linear, periodised, event-bound, great-men stories simply because it used to do 
so in the past? Such an assumption, in my view, does scant justice to its full 
potential.64 
     But is it possible, then, to achieve the kind of synthesis implied here? How 
can we produce, for example, a historical narrative that combines high politics, 
grand ideas and universalising models with less spectacular aspects of human 
experience, such as local stories, individual memory and personal beliefs 
(Geertz’ ‘thick-description’ type of narrative), setting them in a non-linear, 
non-periodised, polycentric arrangement? That question now conveniently 
brings us all the way back to Herodotus, the beginning of the story, and of 
History. By all odds he is a paragon of postmodern historiography. His mastery 
of storytelling has never been called into question even by his fiercest critics, not 
excluding Plutarch. 65  He is often more willing to emerge as an intimate 
first-person narrator than stealthily stay behind a faceless third-person 
narrative.66 His narrative flow is notoriously of the kind that Roland Barthes 
called ‘zigzag history (l’histoire en zigzags)’ and more sombre structuralists ‘ring 
composition’; 67 and ending as it is with a chronologically and conceptually 
                                                   
64 This seems however to be the common assumption even among those favourably disposed 
to narrative: so also Stone (1979), pp. 3f.; for a criticism of this oversimplification, Berkhofer 
(1995), pp. 26f.; 35f. 
65 Indeed for Fehling himself Herodotus’ virtues in this respect were manifest, and his 
censure was not directed at Herodotus but at apologists who attempted to explain away what 
he himself appreciated as fictions, and not as lies; see e.g. Fehling (19892), pp. 8f.; 245-254. 
66 For a narratological definition of the ‘narrator’, as opposed to the ‘author’ (though in 
practice they are mostly identical in modern historiography: cf. Genette [1993], pp. 68-79), 
and the ways it features in Herodotean narrative, see de Jong (2004), pp. 1-10; 101-110; for 
Herodotus’ tactical use of first-person narration, Thomas (2000), pp. 235-247; Dewald (2002); 
Brock (2003), pp. 8-16. On the recent call for making the historical narrator ‘overt’ in his 
narrative, Burke (20012), p. 290. 
67 Barthes ([1967] 1984), p. 155. For the organising principles of Herodotean narrative in 
general, see Lang (1984), pp. 1-17; Gould (1989), pp. 42-62; Lateiner (1989), pp. 39f.; 114-125; 
212ff.; de Jong (2002); id. (2004), pp. 111ff. A number of postmodernists have curiously 
decided that the concept of ‘time’, together with its implied ‘causality’, is an oppressive, white 
male construct, to be abandoned altogether in a multicultural world; for a convenient 
summary, see Rosenau (1991), pp. 62ff.; 85; 171; typical expressions of this view can be found 
in Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, 1992, and Ermarth, Sequel to History, 1992 (both 
extracted in Jenkins [1997], pp. 39ff.). This has resulted in some experimental historical 
prose that breaks down not only chronological sequences but any semblance of coherence as is 
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misplaced recollection of Cyrus’ counsel, it has no immediately recognisable exit, 
at any rate to our modern, or rather modernist eyes.68 
     These formal points may appear rather frivolous to some. But there is a 
further trait in Herodotus that should recommend him as an ideal historian in 
the postmodern age and beyond: his celebrated poikilia, multi-facetedness, or 
elusiveness if you will. Herodotus is a universalist and a particularist at the 
same time. He is not only ethnocentric but also ‘culturally aware’, so much so as 
to be dubbed philobarbaros.69 He believes (like most other classical historians) 
in individual agency as much as in unconscious or collective or environmental or 
metaphysical compulsions. He is a detached antiquarian and a passionate 
ideologue in one.70 His morals contain a lot of practical wisdom that however 
impose no ultimate solutions. He offers both grand narratives as a historian and 
                                                   
conventionally understood; see a few exotic but amusing specimens collected by Jenkins and 
Munslow (2004), ‘Part 3: Deconstructionism’. 
68 Of all the problems of ‘closure’ in classical historiography (a topic of much interest to me: cf. 
my as yet unpublished papers ‘How Did Posidonius Close his Histories?’, read at Edinburgh, 
May 1997, and ‘When Did the Social War End? The Structure of Diodorus Bks. 37-38’, read at 
Tokyo University, Nov. 2001), the concluding passages of Herodotus would constitute the 
most famous and most enigmatic, causing scholarly uneasiness since Wilamowitz and 
prompting suspicions of incompleteness, interpolation etc.; Dewald (1997) offers a useful 
up-to-date summary of the past literature on the question and a postmodernist interpretation 
of her own. 
69 Plut. Mor. 857A, De Herod. malign. 12. Interest in the way Herodotus represents the 
ethnic, sexual and geographical (in addition, of course, to the chronological) ‘others’ in his 
digressions naturally features prominently in many recent publications, esp. those of Hartog 
(1980); Gould (1989), pp. 86-109; 129ff.; Lateiner (1989), pp. 135-162; Thomas (2000), chs. 2-4; 
Munson (2001), pp. 73-172; several contributors to Bakker, de Jong and van Wees (2002); and 
Derow and Parker (2003); see Rood (2006) for the most recent summary and bibliog. to date of 
this issue – an issue that can again easily be overshadowed if not overwhelmed by 
contemporary preoccupations: e.g. Munson, ibid., speaks of Herodotus’ ‘polemic against 
cultural chauvinism, cultural imperialism, and racism’, Rood, ibid., of his ‘message of 
tolerance’ for cultural diversity, Thomas, ibid., pp. 113-134, and Geary (2002), pp. 44ff., of his 
sensitivity towards the fluid nature of ethnic identity; whether this Herodotus the liberal, 
enlightened multiculturalist (pace Hartog) will survive the current backlash against liberal, 
enlightened multiculturalism in real life remains to be seen. The treatment of Herodotus in 
broader postcolonial discourses (esp. in Bernal, Hartog and, by natural extension, Said) is 
summarised and critiqued by Thompson (1996), pp. 112-141; for a general review, and the 
historian’s criticism, of ‘Saidism’ as variously set and revised in postmodern contexts, see 
MacKenzie (1995), pp. 3-39. 
70 Fornara (1971), Evans (1991), Moles (2002) and with less hyperbole Lateiner (1989), pp. 
132ff., and Munson (2001), esp. pp. 172-131, reject the traditional charge against Herodotus 
of blind partisanship towards Athens (cf. Jacoby [1913], cols. 357-360), instead seeing in the 
text a warning against contemporary Athenian imperialism; for the general trend to view him 
as something of a political scientist (on a par with or even better than Thucydides – maybe), 
see Raaflaub (2002), pp. 164-186; Fowler (2004); Forsdyke (2006). 
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‘little stories’ as a storyteller. In other words, he stands for everything that 
postmodernism likes, and dislikes. In a mysterious way I still cannot gauge, he 
transcends all these supposed dichotomies without being too eclectic or stiflingly 
politically correct.71 This quality in his work, together with its sheer sweep of 
space, time and themes, has always made the Father of History the guiding 
light, as a cliché goes, whenever a new widening of men’s intellectual horizons 
has demanded a new understanding of the world.72 So today’s postmodernist 
and anti-postmodernist camps could do worse than consult him, should they 
ever wish to settle their futile disputes. And tomorrow’s storyteller-historian 
might as well take his cue from him. Perhaps this is more than a matter of 
literary emulation. Herodotus composed in an age of scientific rationalism, so 
that no sooner had his historiê appeared, with all the thômata it paraded, than 
it invited predictable accusations of mendacity, of being the lying Other, from 
his contemporaries. For all that, and whatever Thucydides made of it, the story 
he told has turned out ‘a possession for all time’ in the end. We might as well 
draw a lesson or two from this truly postmodern reversal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
71 These views are variously voiced by Hartog (1980), pp. 378ff.; Gould (1989); Lateiner 
(1989); Momigliano (1990), pp. 39f.; 50ff.; Munson (2001); Bakker, de Jong and van Wees 
(2002); Dewald and Marincola (2006); above all Thomas (2000), who, for all her insistence on 
the ‘context’ (New Historicist-speak for ‘intertextuality’) that generated the Histories, appears 
very much given to projecting our contemporary ‘postmodern conditions’ onto the 
fifth-century world of Herodotus; her overall thesis is also closely paralleled by Raaflaub 
(2002). 
72 See Momigliano ([1958] 1966), pp. 135-141. 
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